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Corporation-StatutoryLiability for a ".alseCertificate- What Laws
are Penal in the InternationalSense.
The statute of New York, making the officers of a c6rporation who
sign and record a false certificate of the amount of its capital stock

•

,

civilly liable to its creditors for all its debts, is not a penal law in the
sense that it cannot be enforced in a foreign State or country.
Laws are penal in the international sense only when imposing
punishment for an offense committed against the State or public of a
nature criminal or quasi-criminal, not where the wrong and redress provided is to the individual and the remedy civil.
The refusal of the courts of one State to enforce a judgment of
another State, not penal in the international sense, denies to the judgment the full faith, credit and effect to which it is entitled under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. It, therefore, raises a Federal
question, and such refusal may be reversed by the Supreme Court of
the United States on writ of error.

Opinion by GRAY, J.
THE NATURE AND ENFORCEABILITY IN A FOREIGN jURISDICTION OF
THE INDIVIDUAL STATUTORY LIABILITY IFOR CORPORATE DEBTS
-OF CORPORATE OIFICERS, DIRECTORS, OR TRUSTEES, ATTACHING
UPON BREACH OF CERTAIN STATUTORY DUTIES.
The importance of this recent
deliverance of our highest Federal
court is, in its plain limitation of
the meaning of the word penal in
the international sense to crimes
and misdemeanors and such other
suits for penalties, quasi-criminal,
as may be instituted in the namle
or in favor and for the protection
of the State or public. The de'Reported in 146 U. S., 657.

cision disposes, so far as the Federal
jurisdiction goes, of any prior uncertainty as to the subject-matter
of this note, and squarely overrules
several State decisions, and the rule
laid down in the text-books founded
thereon, wherever the liability has
merged in a judgment of the
foreign State. In other words, to
alljudgments for tort, as well as
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contract, and whether the liability
be statutory or at common law,
there is now extended the provisions of Art. 4, I of the Federal
Constitution and the Act of May
26, 1790 (Rev. Stat., 9o5), defining
and enforcing the same; and the
refusal of any State court to give
'such faith and credit' to such
judgments of other States 'as
they had by law or usage in the
courts of the State of which they
are taken,' is made a ground for
removal or appeal to the Federal
court. It is expressly held, however, thai the Federal jurisdiction
does not extend to the refusal of
one State to entertain a suit upon
the originalliabilityas existing in
the -other State, and the reason
given is because ' the Constitution
and laws of the United States have
not authorized its (the State's)
decision upon such a question to
be reviewed by this court;' but
only where the original liability
(not penal in the international
sense) 'has passed into judgment'
in the other State, in which case
only does the refusal to enforce the
liability confer jurisdiction upon
the Federal court. On the other
hand, it is held that 'the essential
nature and real foundation of a
cause of action are not changed
by recovering judgment upon it'
where the question is. 'whether
the claim ig really one'of such a
nature that the court is authorized
to enforce it;' and, therefore,
where the liability is penal in the
international sense, the fact that it
has merged in a jiidgment of the
other State does not confer jurisdiction; that every court must
determine the nature of the liability
for itself.
PrioiStateDecisions oui the SubJ, et.-Proceedings in another State

upon the foreign liability must be
either upon the original cause of
action or upon a foreign judgment
already had thereon and certified
over to the new forum for recognition and enforcement under the
Constitution and Act of Congress
aforesaid. Derrickson v. Smith,
27 N. J., I66; Halsey v. McLean,.
94 Mlass. (12 Allen), 438, and Plymouth Firit Nat. Bank v. Price, 33
Md., 487, referred to by the learned
justice in the principal case, were
actions upon the original liability;
while Spencer v. Brockway, i Ohio,
259; Healy v. Root, II Picki, 389,
and Indiana v. Helmer, 21 Iowa,
370, referred to by the same justi ce
in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.,
infra, were upon judgments already obtained.
By reference first to the three.
cases first above mentioned we may"
see the position hitherto taken by
certain state tribunals where the
question has arisen unencumbered
by the suggestion'of a violation of
the Federal mandate as to the
records and judgments of other'
States. Mr. Justice GRAY, in the
principal case, disposes of all three
cases as follows: "It is true that
the courts of some States . . .
have declined to enforce a similar
liability imposed by the statute of
another State. But in each of
these cases it appears to have been
assumed to be a sufficient ground
for that conclusion that the liability
was not founded in contract, but
ivas in the nature of a penalty im-.
posed by statute; and no reasons
were given for considering the
statute a penal law in the strict,
primary and international sense."
In Derrickson v. Smith, supra,
the plaintiff sued at law in New
Jersey a trustee of a New York
corporation for goods sold and
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delivered to the corporation, setting out a violation by said
trustee of a certain New York
Act making it the duty of the
president and a majority of the
trustees of the corporation, within twenty days of the first day of
January of each year, to make,
publish and file a sworn report as
to the capital and indebtedness of
the corporation, under penalty of
becoming jointly and severally
liable for all debts of the corporation existing or contracted before
such report made. It is well settled
that a stockholders statutory liability for the debts of the corporation
i's upon an implied contract voluntarily assumedupon the acquisition
of the stock, whether by subscription or subsequent purchase: Hathorn v. Calef, 69 U. S., Io; Carrol
v. Green, 92 U. S., 509; Flash v.
Conn, 109 U. S., 371; and counsel
for plaintiff in Derrickson v. Smith,
supra, while conceding that, as a
general proposition, penal laws are
strictly local, contended that under
said New York Act, the implication
of contract was as justifiable in the
case of the liability imposed upon
a delinquent trustee' as in the case
of that imposed upon the stockholders by another section of the
same Act. The court, however, was
unable to see any -analogy between
the implied agreement of the stock.
holder to the terms of his charter,
of which the statutory liability to
corporate creditors must be considered as a part, and the penalty
imposed upon the trustee for breach
of a subsequent statutory duty.
The court was disposed rather to
adopt the reasoning of the 'New
York cases cited, that corporations
whose stockholders are made liable
for corporate debts are vested with
but a qualified corporate capacity,

and the stockholders left, without
personal exemption or immunity,
to their original and primary liability as partners and original parties
to the debts; that on the other
hand the liability of the delinquent
trustee arose, not out of the cottract made by the corporation, nor
from his acceptance of his office,
but solely from his subsequent
wrongful neglect, I,MBR, J., saying: "This neglect is in the nature
of a tort,and the consequent liability is the penalty which they are
to pay. It is altogether different
from the original liability of a
partner, and in my judgment cannot, by any fair reasoning, be
brought within the terms of the
original contract. . . . The
liability . . . is . . . created by
statute, and never existed until the
neglect occurred which entitled the
creditors to claim it. The original
indebtedness was that of the corporation and of the stockholders to
the extent of their stock. The
trustees, by neglecting to report,
were made liable by way of punish-

ment for an offense."

VRIDN-

J., said: "When the debt
was contracted the defendants were
not liable, but only the corporation.
The goods were not sold on the
credit of the defendants, but only
on that of the corporation; the
plaintiffs cannot say that they sold
the goods . . . upon any contract, express or implied, vwith the
trustees, that at some time afterward they, the trustees, would or
might neglect to advertise; they
trusted, and had a right to trust,
the corporation upon no such
speculation.
If the defendants
have become liable, it is not because of any contract between
them and the plaintiffs, but because
long afterward they neglected to do
BURG,
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something they were commanded
to do by the statute. If they became liable at all it was not by
way of contract, but by way of
penalty. The statute says that the
trustees shall advertise, and that if
they do not they shall pay, not all
theirown debts, but all the debts of
the corporation. 'The statute is
clearly and purely penal
it is clear it cannot be enforced in
this State."
In Halsey v. McLean, supra,
the Massachusetts court refused to
enforced the same New York Act
against a New York trustee in
Massachusetts, on the ground that
"penal laws will be allowed no
extra-territorial operation," and
the construction in this respect of
the New York courts of their own
Act was conclusive.
In First National Bank of Plymouth v. Price, supra, the Maryland courts declined to Enforce
a Pennsylvania Act, imposing a
joint and several liability upon
officers and directors of certain
corporations for corporate debts
contracted in excess of the capital
paid in, BARTOL, C. J., saying:
"while a contract made in one
State is enforced in other States
agreeably to the law of the State
where it is made, it is well settled
that no State will enforce penalties imposed by the laws of
other States.; such laws are universally considered as having no
extra-territorial operation." Derrickson v. Smith and Halsey v.
McLean, sitfra,were cited and approved, and the learned judge concluded his opinion as follows:
"This liability does not arise upon
any contract to which the directors
are parties; but is altogether statutory imposed ou them as wrongdoers. and in its nature penal, and

as such can only be enforced within the State where the statute operates."
In Wisconsin v, Pelican Ins. Co.,
infra, Mr. Justice GRAY was arguing againstthe enforceability of
the foreign liability there presented, although already merged in
judgment, and Spencer v. Brockway, Healy v. Root and Indiana v.
Helmer, suipra, all three cases being upon foreign judgments, were
cited to sustain the enforceability
of such foreign liabilities, at least
when so merged.
The learned,
justice, however, after first holding
that 'the essential nature and real
foundation of a cause of action are
not changed by- recovering judgment upon it,' where the question
of jurisdiction must be determined
dismisses these cases as follows:
"The decision in each of these
cases appears to have been mainly
upon the supposed effect of the
provisions of the Constitution and
the Act of Congress as to the faith
and credit due to a judgment rendered in another State which had
not then received a full exposition
from this Court; and the other
reasons assigned dre not such as to
induce us to accept those decisions
as satisfactory precedents to guide
our judgment in the present case."
In Spencer v. Brockway the plain
tiff brought suit in Ohio, describing
himsel fas the treasurer of the State
of Connecticut and reciting judgments recovered by his predecessor in the office upon two forfeited
recognizances taken in consequence of an alleged violation of
the penal laws of Connecticut, and
all the Court said in answer to the
defendant's second point, that
'the courts of one State will not
enforce the penal laws of a sister
State,' was, 'The suit is for the re-
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covery of a sum of money. It is
founded on judgments obtained in
. the State of Connecticut,
...
and not on the penal laws of that
State . The objection, therefore,
cannot be sustained.
In Heal r v. Root the plaintiff
sued in Massachusetts upon a
*judgment had in Pennsylvania
"En a qui tam action on a penal
statute for usury, providing that
one-half of-the amount recovered
should go io the State and the
remaining half to plaintiff. The
point was expressly made that
'the original cause of action being
qui tam for a penalty, wherein the
commonwealth of Pennsylvania
ws interested, could not have been
sued and enforced here, and so a
judgmentrendered there upon such
a cause will not be enforced here;'
'but the Court could not perceive
the force of the argument because,
'after the plaintiff had by a verdict
and judgment reduced his damages
to a certainty, the original cause
of action would be merged in the
judgment,' and held that, as the
foreign record showed jurisdiction
of the cause and of the parties, it
must be held conclusive.
In Indiana v. Helmer the State of
Indiana sued, in Iowa, upon a judgment recovered in Indiana for the
support of a bastard, and CoIB, J.,
said: "It is claimed that the subject matter of the action is one of
merely local police regulation in
the State of Indiana, under its laws,
and that it is not competent for
the courts of another State to undertake its enforcement. There is
much truth in the legal proposition
. . . but the error is in its aplilicahad
tion. If the mother . . ..
coine to Iowa and sought by legal
proceedings to compel the defendant, its father, to support it and to

give bond therefor, and otherwise
to comply with the requirements
of the statutes of Indiana, the
answer of the defendant that the
subject matter of such action was
one of merely local police regulation of Indiana, not enforceable in
this State, would have been conclusive and amount to a complete
defense: Graham v. Monsugh, 22
Vermont, 543. Such an action can
no more be sustained beyond the
limits of the sovereignty within
which it arose than can an,action
for any other penalty provided by
statute of such sovereignty for the
wrongful act of a defendant therein. Both are alike matters of local,
internal police and enforceable
alone by the sovereignty making
the'regulation and providing the
penalty. But when the local jurisdiction has attached, and the courts
of that State or sovereignty have
properly taken cognizance of the
matter and rendered judgment for
such penalty, such judgment is
entitled to ' full faith and credit'in
every other State. If the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties, it is sufficient to ehtitle
the plaintiff therein to maintain an
action thereon in another State.
And the courts of such other State
will not inquire into the facts upon
which it was based, nor whether the
cause of action would have been
enforced by them: Healy d. Root,
ii Pick., 389; Connecticut v.
Bradish, 14 Mass., 296."
But, said Mr. Justice GRAY, in
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.,
infra (reasserting it in Huntington
v. Attrill): "The application of
the rule [' the courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another']
is not affected by the provisions of
the Constitution and of the Act of
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Congress, by which the judgments
merged in judgment The future
influence, or authority ofsuch state
of the courts of any State are to
have such faith and credit given to
decisions as the first three, above
them in every court within the noticed, which have refused to enUnited States as they have by law tertain proceedings upon original
or usage in the State in which they liabilities no longer penal, in the
Federal view, as between the States,
were rendered. Const., Art. iv,
I; Act May 26, 1790, chap. II, I Stat.
must remain to be seen. They are
at L., 122 ; Rev. Stat., 9o5. 'These not within the Federal jurisdiction,
provisions establish a rule of evias will hereinafter appear.
dence, rather than of jurisdiction.
One or Two PriorFederal DeWhile they make the record of a cisions.-In Wisconsin v. Pelican
judgment, rendered after due notice
Ins. Co., of New Orleans, 127 U.
in one State, conclusive evidence in
S., 265, the State of Wisconsin sued
the courts of another State, or of the defendant company in Louisthe United States, of the matter iana, upon a judgment already had
adjudged, they do not affect the
in Wisconsin, for non-compliance
jurisdiction, either of'the court in
with certain provisions of a Wisconsin Act as to fire insurance com
which the judgment is rendered,
panies doing business within that
or of the court in which it is offered
as evidence.
. .
The essential
State. This Act provided that durnature and real "foundation of a
ing the month of January of each
cause of action are not changed by
year, all such companies should derecovering judgment upon it, and .posit with the state commissioner
the technical rules, which- regard
of insurance a sworn statement of
the original claim as merged in the
the condition of the company's
judgment, and the judgment as
business and assets for the pregious
implying a promise by the defend- year, and imposed on any corpora-.
ant to pay it, do not preclude a
tion, or officer thereof, failing so to
court, to which a judgment is pre- do, or making any willfully false
sented for affirmative action (while statement, a.fine of $5oo, with an
it cannot go behind the judgment
additional $5oo for every month.
for the purpose *ofexamining into thereafter such company should
the validity of the claim), from as- continue to do business until such
certaining
hether the claim is
statement should be filed. By anreally one of such a nature that the
other Act, I,it was "made the duty
court is authorized to enforce it:
of the commissioner of insurance
Louisiana v. New Orleans, io9 U. to prosecute to final judgment, in
S., 285, 298, 281; Louisiana v. St. the name of the State, or to comMartin's Parish, III U. S., 716;
promise, settle or compound, every
Chase v. Curtis, 1i3 U. S., 452, 464;
forfeiture incurred by an insurance
Boynton v. Ball, 121 U. S., 457,466."
corporation, by its failure to comThis disposes, so far at least as the ply with, or for its violation of, any
Federal courts are concerned, of law of the State, of which he may
state decisions, such as the last
be credibly informed;" and by 2,
"one-half of every sum collected,
three above noticed, which have
given efficacy to the foreign liabilpaid or received by virtue of I of
ity, clearly penal in the interna- this act shall be paid into the state
tional sense, because of its having
treasury, and the remainder shall
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belong to the commissioner of insurance, who shall pay all expenses
incurred in prosecuting all actions
brought to enforce the payment of
such forfeitures, both in and out of
the State, and shall pay all expenses incident to the collection of
Mr. Justice
such. forfeitures."
GRAY, after observing that the
constitutional and statutory provisions conferring original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of
the United States in controversies
between States, or between a State
and citizens of another State, were
not conclusive as to the nature of
the controversies warranting the
assumption of the jurisdiction, and
in reviewing said provisions and
the cases thereon, said: "By the
law of England and the United
States, the penal laws of a country
do Aot reach beyond its own territory. . . . Chief Justice MARSHA91stated the rule . . . as
an incontrovertible maxim: 'The
courts of no country execute the
penal laws of another:' The Antelope, io Wheat., 66, 123.
The rule . . . applies not only
to prosecutions and sentences for
crimes and misdemeanors, but to
all suits in favor of the State for
the recovery of pecuniary penalties
for any violation of statutes for the
protection of its revenue, or other
municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties. If this
were not so all that would be necessary to give ubiquitous effect to a
penal law would be to put the claim
for a penalty into the shape of a
judgment. Whart. Conft. L., Ist
Ed., ,833; Westlake, Internat. L.,
Ist Ed.,
388; Piggott, Foreign
Judg., 209, 210. . . . ' But this
[the duty to enforce foreign judg
ments or decrees for civil debts or
damage] includes not a decree de-

cerning for a penalty; because no
court reckons itself bound to pun.
ish, or to concur in punishing, any
delict committed extra territorium.' 2 Kameron Equity, 3d Ed.,
326, 366; Story, Conft. L.,
6oo,
622." After a review of the cases in
which the Supreme Court had assumed, or declined, jurisdiction, as
aforesaid, for the purpose of showing the civil nature of the liabilities
presented, as the condition of the
assumption, and that parties alone
do not confer jurisdiction in the
case of 'a suit or prosecution by
the one State of such a nature that
it could not, on the settled principles of public and international
law, be entertained by the judiciary
of the other State,' even though
upon a judgment already obtained
(as already quoted); the learned
justice continued: "The position
that the jurisdiction conferred by
the Constitution upon this court, in
cases to which a State is party, is
limited to controversies of a civi
nature, does-not depend upon mere
inference from the want of any precedent to the contrary, but has express legislative and judicial sanction."
The learned judge here
quotes the language of the judiciary Act of September 24, 1789,
Chap. § 20, 13, to wit: "The Supretne Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of controversies of a
civil nature, etc. ;" and the language
of Mr.Justice IREDniL, in Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 Dall., 419, " The Act
of Congress more particularly mentions civil controversies, etc.;" and
that of Chief Justice MARSHALL,
in Cohens v. Virginia., 6 Wheat.,
264, "The original jurisdiction refers . . . not to those cases in
which an original suit might not
be instituted in a federalcourt, .
perhaps every case in which a State
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is enforcing its penal laws ;" and
concludes his opinion as follows:
"The statute of Wisconsin under
which the State recovered in one of
her own courts the judgment now
and here sued on, was in the strictest sense a penal statute.
The cause of action was not any
private injury, but solely the offence committed against the State
by violating her law. The prosecution was in the name of the State,
and the whole penalty, when recovered, would accrue to the State, and
be paid, one-half into her treasury,
and the other half to her insurance
commissioner, who pays all expenses of prosecuting for and collecting
such forfeitures: Wis. Stat., 1885,
Chap. 395. The real nature of the
case is not affected by the forms
provided by the law of the State for
the punishment of the offence. It
is immaterial whether, by the law
of Wisconsin, the prosecution must
be by indictment or by action; or,
whether under that law a judgment
there obtained for the penalty might
be enforced by execution, by scire
facias, or by a new suit. In whatever form the State pursues her
right to punish the offence against
her sovereignty, every step in the
proceeding tends to one end, the
compelling the offender to pay a
pecuniary fine by way of punishment for the offence. This court,
therefore, cannot entertain an original action to compel the defendant'
to pay to the State of Wisconsin a
sum of money in satisfaction of the
judgment for that fine."
The
learnedjustice in the principal'case
states that Wisconsin v. Pelican
Ins. Co., was much relied on in
argumentby both sides, and enough
of it has been quoted for an understanding of this remark, and especially of just how matters stood
62
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immediately prior to the decision
in Huntington v. Attrill.
Another case particularly referred to in the principal case was
that of Dennick v. Central R. R.
Co. of N. J., I3 U. S., Ii. It thus.
figures in the principal case. Says
the learned justice: "The question whether a statute of one State,
which in some aspects may be
called penal, is a penal law in the
international sense, so that it can- •
not be enforced in the courts of
another State, depenids upon, the
question whether its purpose is to
punish an offense against the public justice of the State, or to afford
a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act There
coild be no better illustration qf
this than the decision of this court
in Dennick v. Central R. R. Co., of
N.J., IO3 U. S.,.rI. In that case it
was held that, by virtue of a statute
of New Jersey making a person of
corporation whose wrongful act,
neglect or default should cause the
death of any person, liable td an
action by his administrator for the
benefit ofhiswidow and next of kin,
to recover damages for the pecuniary injuryresulting to them from
his death, such an action, where.
the neglect and the death took
place in New Jersey, might, upon
general principles of law, be maintained in a Circuit Court of the
United States held in the State of
New York by an administrator of
the deceased appointed in that
State. Mr. Justice MILrER, in delivering judgment, said: It can
scarcely be contended that the act
belongs to the class of criminal
laws which can only be enforced
by the courts of the State where
the offense was committed, for it is,
though a statutory remedy, a civil
action to recover damages for a civil
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injury. It is, indeed, a right dependent solely on the statute of the
State; but when the act is done for
whiich the law says the person shall
'be liable, and the action by which
the remedy is to be enforced is a
*personal and not a real action, and
is of that character which the law
*recognizes as transitory and not
local, we cannot see why the de. "fendant may not be held liable in
any cqurt to whose jurisdiction he
can be subjected by personal process or by voluntary appearance, as
was the case here. It is difficult
to understand how the nature of
the remedy, or the jurisdiction of
the courts to enforce it, is in any
manner dependent on the question
-whether it is a statutory right or a
common law right. Wherever, by
eithe the common law 6r the statute law-of a State, a right of action
has become fixed, and a legal lia,bility incurred, that liability may
be enforced and the right of action
pursued in any court which has
jurisdiction of such matters and
can obtain jurisdiction of the paities. Dennick v. Central R. R.
Co. of N. J., 1O3 U. S., 17, 18. That
decision is important as establishing two -points: (i) The court considered 'criminal laws,' that is to
say, laws punishing crimes, as constituting the whole class of penal
laws which cannot be enforced extra-territorially. (2) A statute of
a State, manifestly intended to protect life, and to impose a new and
extraordinary civil liability upon
those causing death, by subjecting
them to a private action for the
pecuniary damages thereby Tesulting to the family of the deceased,
mightbe enforced in a Circuit Court
of the United States heldiin another
State, without regard to the question whether a similar liability

would have attached for a similar
cause in that State."
In Huntington v. Attrill, the
plaintiff had obtained judgment
against Attrill in New York as a
guilty director of the debtor corporation, and pursued him thereon
in the State of Maryland (and elsewhere, vide infra). In his bill in
equity in Maryland against defendant and his wife and daughters to
set aside as fraudulent the transfer
of certain stock in a Maryland
company, and to charge that stock
with the payment of said New York
judgment, plaintiff-averred, as the
original ground of defendants' liability, the making and recording in
New York of a false certificate in
violation of a. certain New York
Act, providing that 'The directors
of every such company, within
thirty days after the payment of
the last instalment of the capital
stock, shall make a certificate stating the amount of the capital so
paid in, which certificate shall be
signed and sworn to by the president and a majority of the directors; and they shall, within the
said thirty days, record the same
in the office of the secretary of
state, and of the county in which
the principal business office of such
cQrporation is situated,' and; "If
any certificate or report made...
shall be false in any material representation, all the officers ,yho shall
have signed the same shall be
jointly and severally liable for
all the debts of the corporation
contracted while they are officers.'
One' of the daughters demurred
to the bill on the ground that
'the plaintiff's claim was for
the recovery of a penalty against
Attrill arising under a statute of
New York." The circuit court
of Baltimore city overruled the
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demurrer, but the Maryland Court
of Appeals reserved this ruling
and dismissed the bill: Attrill
v. Huntington, 70 Md., 191. The
majority of the court below thought
that, as the liability was for all the
corporate debts, irrespective of
whether the creditor had suffered
any deception, or of the insolvency
of the company, and unlimited, as
it were, it was intended as a punishment, and, therefore, in view of
prior decisions both of New York
and Maryland, and that of the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Pellican Ins. Co., sui:ra,could not be
enforced beyond the limits of the
State of New York.
Mr. Justice GRAY thus quotes the
minority opinion, by STONE, J.:
"' I look upon the.principal point
as a Federal question, and am governed in my views more by my
understanding of the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the Tjnited
States than by the decisions of the state courts.' And he concluded
thus: 'I think the Supreme Court,
in 127 U. S., meant to confine the
operation of the rule that no
country will execute the penal laws
of another to such laws as are
properly classed as criminal. It is
not very easy to give any brief definition of a criminal law. It may,
perhaps, be enough to say that, in
general, all breaches of duty that
confer no rights upon an individual
or person, and which the State
alone can take cognizance of, are
in their nature criminal, and that
all such come within the rule. But
laws which, while imposing a duty,
at the same time confer a right
upon the citizens to claim damages
for its non-performance, are not
criminal. If all the laws of the
latter description are held penal in
the sense of criminal, that clause

in the Constitution which relates
to records and judgments is of
comparatively little value. There
is a large and constantly increasing
number of cases that in one sense
may be termed penal, but can in no
sense be classed as criminal. Examples of these may be found in
suits for damages for negligence
in causing death, for double damages for the injury to stock where
railroads have neglected the state
laws for fencing in their tracks and
the liability of officers of corporations for the debts of the company
by reason of their neglect of a plain
duty imposed by statute. I cannot
think that judgments on such
claims"are not within the protection
given by the Constitution of*the
United States. I therefore think
the order in this case should be
affirmed." Mr. Justice GRAY then
calls attention to the various shades
of meaning given to the word
penal, and says: "Penal laws,
strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offence
committed against the State, and
which, by the English and American constitutions, the executive of
the State has the power to pardon.
Statutes giving a private action
against the wrongdoers are sometimes spoken of as penal in their
nature, but in such cases it has
been pointed out that neither the
liability imposed nor the remedy
given is strictly penal."
After further illustrating from
numerous cases the different uses
of the word penal and the remedial
side of the many so-called penal
laws, he continues: "The test
whether a law is penal, in the
strict and primary sense, is whether
themirong sought to be redressed
is a wrong to the public, or a wrong
to the individual, according to the
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familiar classification of Blackstone. .

. Crimes and offences

.

against the laws of any State can
only be defined, prosecuted and
pardoned by the sovereign authority
of that State; and the authorities,
legislative, executive or judicial,
of other States take no action with
regard to them except by way of
extradition. . . . For the purposes of extra-territorial jurisdiction it may well be that actions by
a common informer, called, as
Blackstone says, ' popular actions,
because they are given to the
.people in general,' to recover a
penalty imposed by statute for an
offense against the law, and which
may be barred by a pardon granted
before action brought, may stand
on the same ground as suits broight
for such a penalty in the name of the
State or of its officers, because they
are equally brought to enforce the
criminal law of the State.
The question whether a statute
is a penal law in the
...
.
deinternational sense . . ..

pends upon the question whether
its purpose is to punish an offense
against the public justice of the
State, or to afford a private remedy
to a person injured by the wrongful
act.

. The provision of the

.

.

statute of New York, now in question,

.

.

.

is in no sense a

criminal or quasi-criminal
The statute

.

law.

. takes pains to

.

secure and- maintain a proper corporate fund for the payment of the
corporate debts

.

.

. it makes

the stockholders individually liable
for the debts of the corporation
until the capital stock is paid in
and a certificate of the payment
made by the officers; and makes the
"officers liable for any false and
material representation in that certificate. The individual liability of

the stockholders takes the place of
a corporate fund, until that fund has
been duly created; and the individual liability of the officers takes
the place of the fund, in case their
statement that it has been duly
created is false.- If the officers do
not truly state and record the facts
which exempt them from liability,
they are made liable directly to
every creditor of the company who,
by reason of their wrongful acts,
has not the security for the payment of his debt out of the corporate property, on which he had a
right to rely. As the statute imposes a burdensome liability on the
officers for their wrongful act, it
may well be considered penal, in
.the sense that it should be strictly
construed. But as it gives a civil
remedy, at the private suit of the
creditor only, and measured by the
amount of his debt, it is as to him
To maintain
clearly remedial.
such a suit is not to administer a
punishment imposed upon an offender against the State, but simply
to enforce a private right secured
under its laws to an individual. We
can see no just -ground, on principle, for holding such a statute to
be a penal law, in the sense that it
cannot be enforced in a foreign
state or country."
"The learned justice proceeds
further to review the New York
cases, dismisses the New Jersey,
Massachusetts and Maryland cases,
as already noticed, and refers to
the litigation against Attrill, in
.Canada, as follows: "The true
limits of the international rule are
well settled in the decision of the
judicial committee of the Privy
Council of England, upon an appeal from Canada, in an action
brought by the present plaintiff
against Attrill, in the province of

A VALSE CERTIFICATE.
Ontario, upon the judgment to enforce which the present suit was
brought. The Canadian judges .
. .
differed in opinion upon
the question whether the statute of
New York was a penal law which
could not be enforced in another
country, as well as upon the question whether the view taken by the
courts of New York should be
conclusive upon foreign courts,
and finally gave judgment for the
defendant Huntington v. Attrill,
17 Ont. App., 245; I8 Ont. App.,
136. In the Privy Council, Lord
WATSON, speaking for Lord Chancellor HAIrsnURy and other judges,
as well as for himself, delivered an
opinion in favor of reversing the
judgment below, and entering a
decree for the appellant, upon the
ground that the action was not, in
the sense of international law,
penal. . . . 'The rule' .(of international law), said Lord NWTSON, 'had its foundation in the
well recognized principle that
crimes, including in that term all
breaches of public law punishable by pecuniary mulct or otherwise, at the instance of the state
government, or of some one representing the public, were local in
this sense, that they were only
cognizable and punishable in the
country where they were committed. Accordingly, no proceeding, even ii the shape of a civil
suit, which had for its object the
enforcement by the State, whether
directly or indirectly, of punishment imposed for such breaches by
the lex loci, ought to be admitted
in the courts of any other country.
In its ordinary acceptation the
word 'penal' might embrace penalties for infractions of general law
which did not constitute- offenses
against- the State; it might, for
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many legal purposes, be appIied
with perfect propriety to penalties
created by contract; and it, therefore, when taken by itself, failed
to mark that distinction between
civil rights and criminal wrongs,
which was the very essence of the
international rule....
"A proceeding, in order to come
within the scope of the rule, must
be in the nature of a suit in favor
of the State whose law had been
infringed. All the provisions of
.nunicipal statutes for the regulation of trade and trading companies
were presumably eeacted in the interest and for the benefit of the
community at large; and persons
who violated those provisions were,
in a certain sense, offenders against
the state law as well as against individuals who might be injured by
their misconduct. But foreign tribunals did not regard those violations of statute law as offenses
against the State, unless their vindication rested with the State itself
or with the community which it
represented. Penalties might be
attached to them, but that circumstance would not bring themi within
the rule, except in cases where
those penalties were recoverable at
the instance of the State, or of an
official duly authorized to prosecute
on itsbehalf, or of a member of the
public in the character of a common informer. An action by the
latter was regarded as an actiopopularispursued, not in his individual
interest, but in the interest of the
Their
whole community ....
lordships could not assent to the
proposition that, in. considering
whether the present action was
penal in such sense as to oust their
jurisdiction, the courts of Ontario
were bound to pay absolute deference to any interpretation which

-
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might have been put upon the statute . . . in the State of New YorkThey had to construe and apply an
international ,rule, which was a
matter of law entirely within the
cognizance of the foreign court
whose jurisdiction was invoked.
. . . The court appealed to must
determine for itself, in the first
place, the substance of the right
sought to be enforced, and, in the
second place, whether its enforcement would, either directly or indirectly, involve the execution of
the penal law of another State."
[Law Rep. App. Cases, 1893, Part
2, page I50.] After expressing his
approval of the foregoing, Mr. Justice GRAY continues: "In' this
country, the question of international law must be determined in
the first instance by the court, State
or national, in which the suit is
brought. If the suit is brought in
i circuit court of the United States,
it is one of those questions of general jurisprudence which that court
must decide for itself, uncontrolled
by local decisions: Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S., 20, 33; Texas and
P. R. Co. V. Cox, 145 U. S., 593,
605. . . . If a suit on the original
liability under the statute of one
State, is brought in the court of
another State, the Constitution and
laws of the United States have not
authorized the decision upon such
a question to be reviewed by this
court: New York L. Ins. Co. v.
HIendren, 92 U. S., 286; Roth v.
Elhman, 107 U.S., 319. But if the
original liability has passed into
judgment in one State, the courts
of another State, when asked to enforce it, are bound by the Constitution and laws of the United States
to give full faith and credit to that
judgment, and if they do not, their
decision, . . . may be reviewed

and reversed by this court on writ
of error. The essential nature and
real foundation of a cause of action,
indeed, are not changed byrecovering judgment upon it. . . . The
difference is only in the appellate
jurisdiction of this court in the one
case or the other . . .this court in
determining whether full faith and
credit have been given to that
judgment, must decide for itself
the nature of the original liability."
After some general reference to the
provisions of the Constitution and
and act of Congress as to judgments
and records of other States, sitra,
the leariied justice concludes:
"These provisions . . . give no
effect to judgments of a court
which had no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter or of the parties . . .
they confer no new jurisdiction on
the courts of any State; and therefore do not authorize them to take
jurisdiction of a suit or prosecution
of such a penal nature, that it cannot, on settled rules of public and
international law, be entertained
by the judiciary of any other State
than that in which the penalty was
incurred: Wisconsin v. Pelican Co.,
above cited. Nor . . . put the
judgments of other States upon the
footing of domestic judgments, to
.
be enforced by execution..
But when duly pleaded and proved
. . .they have the effect of being
not merelyprima face evidence,
but conclusive proof bf the rights
thereby adjudicated; and a refusal
to give them the force and effect,
in this respect, which they had in
the State in which they were rendered, denies to the party a right
secured to him by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, citing cases). The judgment . . .
now in question, is not impugned
for any want of jurisdiction., I .

